From the Steppes of Donbas to the Deserts of Syria
The increasing use of first-person view drones in wars and conflicts involving Russia
Authors/Investigators
Mohammad Bassiki (SIRAJ), Abdulkader Dwehe, Christian Mamo, Aleksiina Kallunki (OSINT for Ukraine)
Editor
Orlaith Delaney
After more than 13 years of civil war, the Assad regime collapsed in a matter of weeks in December 2024. With few foreseeing the swiftness of the regime's demise, Russian interests in the region were dealt a resounding blow, following nearly a decade of committed involvement. As arguably the Russian ally which enjoyed the most military backing, the old Syria under Assad proved to be somewhat of a testing ground for Russian military expertise - perhaps the most important element of its relations with friendly states in the ‘global south’.
Of particular interest are the efforts Russia was making to enhance the capabilities of Assad’s army in the 12 months before the regime’s collapse. Beginning in late 2023, regime propaganda websites and social media accounts began publishing photos and videos of Russian instructors training Syrian soldiers in the use of first-person view (FPV) drones - which could be considered the biggest battlefield innovation of the past decade, brought to light by the invasion of Ukraine.
This report delves into the implications of these training programs, shedding light on how Russia is leveraging the military experience it is gaining in its war on Ukraine as a means to further its influence abroad.
Introduction
Following its full-scale intervention in Syria in 2015, Russia was arguably the most steadfast and decisive ally of the Assad regime. Backed by overwhelming Russian airpower, the Syrian state managed to fairly quickly claw back territory throughout the country. By the end of the following year, the Syrian state had full control over the city of Aleppo, rebel enclaves scattered throughout the country fell one by one, and antiregime groups were largely confined to Idlib Province until their breakout in winter 2024. All of the regime’s gains were accomplished at an enormous cost to civilians. Throughout the Russian intervention, a persistent criticism by international media, humanitarian organizations and Syrian civil society was that the Russian state was effectively aiding and abetting—if not outright committing—the Assad regime’s war crimes. Indiscriminate, or even positively terroristic, bombing runs by Syrian and Russian warplanes played a decisive role in the string of defeats suffered by Syrian revolutionaries between 2015 and 2019, which demoralized constituent populations and overwhelmed already stretched opposition resources. The rebels had no response to this tactic.
In the last 12 months of its involvement in Syria, the Russian state was engaged in further enhancing the capabilities of the Assad regime by imparting lessons learned by the Russian army in Ukraine. Of particular interest for the purposes of this report is the proliferation of FPV drones in Syria brought by Russian instructors to the bases of the Assad regime’s most trusted units.
One of these, the 25th Special Forces Division—formerly known as the Tiger Forces—has been accused of some of the worst atrocities of the war, including massacres of protesters in the early days of the conflict.
FPV stands for ‘first-person view’, a technology once used primarily for drone racing, aerial photography, and videography, which has now found its way to battlefields in Ukraine, Syria, Sudan and beyond. The term ‘FPV’ refers to the method by which the drone pilot experiences the flight of the drone through a camera installed on it, which transmits a live video feed to a headset, monitor, or mobile device. This allows the pilot to see from the drone's perspective at a relatively safe distance.
FPV drones represent a rapidly advancing technology that offers significant potential due to their affordability and lethality. They enable precise and targeted operations, making them a formidable tool for executing focused attacks on specific individuals or objectives.
The war in Ukraine precipitated an explosion in the development of FPV drone technology. First pioneered by Ukrainian army units several months into the war, the Russians quickly adapted and began establishing their own production lines. By December 2023, Ukrainian experts warned that Russia was producing six times as many of these drones as Ukraine - up to 300,000 monthly, with the capability to further scale up operations.These figures speak volumes about the efficacy of these weapons. Footage exists of fairly modern tanks being completely obliterated by wellplaced FPV hits. Lighter vehicles are yet more vulnerable. Even using an FPV drone to kill a single enemy soldier represents a more cost-effective use of munitions than conventional methods. The drones themselves are small, highly agile and fast, making them nearly impossible to shoot down with regular bullets. As such, they roam the battlefields of Ukraine with near impunity, coming to represent arguably the most feared weapon of the war.
Of particular concern is the mixture of accessibility and effectiveness provided by FPV drones, putting them within comfortable reach of terrorist organizations, individual assailants, and sanctioned regimes. The technology behind them is quite straightforward and can be assembled by hand in a matter of hours at a low cost. “It’s easy to legally obtain FPV drones for less than 750 euros each and convert them into kamikaze drones,” explains Julian Ropcke, a German military and security analyst speaking to Mohammed Bassiki. “All you need in addition is an RPG-7 warhead or any other type of explosive tied to the drone.”
With these considerations in mind, there were reasonable misgivings about the implications of this technology finding its way into the hands of the Assad regime. According to Ropcke, speaking in mid-2024, “the drones are being used as a terror weapon by the regime rather than strategically to defeat rebel forces. It seems that the regime is using these as a cheap alternative to artillery or mortars, and the threshold for their use is lower due to their ‘civilian’ and even ‘playful’ nature.”
According to Syrian humanitarian organizations, FPVs were used to target civilians - whether as perverse ‘practice’ for operators, or as a continuation of the Syrian state’s strategy of brutality.
This investigation, based on open-source intelligence (OSINT), analyzes the nature of FPV drone usage in Syria by the fallen Assad regime, the implications this had for the Syrian population, and the nature of Russian influence operations.
FPVs
Quadcopter drones, primarily Chinese- and Russian-designed, have been spotted in use by the Syrian Arab Army. The above pictures are likely to show Russian Gastello FPV quadcopters - reported to be in mass production in Russia since 2023.[1] The fourth image shows a screenshot of the drones being featured on Russian state media..
In the above left picture, the operator appears to be carrying a Chinese Mavic 3 drone. The picture to the right shows a drone with the text “MA3” visible.
Training and Deployment
During its involvement in Syria in from 2015-2024, the Russian military preferred to work with a handful of specific Syrian Arab Army units, selected for their loyalty to the Assad regime and their relative combat efficacy compared to regular units. These often became the first-in-line to receive new Russian-manufactured equipment. A similar trend can be observed in regard to Russian training and supply of FPV drones.
Some trainers wear Serbian flag patches. Serbian mercenaries have also been spotted fighting for the Russian military in Ukraine.
According to our analysis using OSINT techniques, three Syrian Arab Army units underwent training in FPV drones usage: the 5th and 7th mechanized divisions, and the 25th Special Mission Forces Division, the renamed “Tiger Forces”, formerly under the command of the notorious Suheil al-Hasan. Al-Hasan is currently the head of the Syrian special forces. Training is evidently not confined just to the deployment of FPV drones. Russian instructors are seen with electronic warfare equipment, and what appears to be a new Russian-developed anti-drone rifle, the Garpiya. Officers up to the rank of brigadier general are seen undergoing training.
Furthermore, based on analysis of images released by pro-regime Telegram and Twitter/X accounts, training appeared to be happening in at least two locations. One was at the 5th Mechanized Division’s headquarters in Izra, rural Daraa province. The second appeared to be in the town of Kom al-Wasiyah, by the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. This was identified again through OSINT analysis.
Image from pro-regime online account. Claims to be showing veterans of the “special military operation” (in Ukraine) training Syrian Army troops.
In the above image, one catches a glimpse of two signs bearing the Syrian flag. These appear to align with the below images, gleaned from the Kom al-Wasiyah municipality’s official Facebook account.
Further pictures were uploaded on the same account of Russian instructors on rooftops, giving further clues regarding their location.
In fact, the rooftop images appear to be of the village municipality building.
As mentioned earlier, the training also went beyond just the use of FPV drones. Some of the images posted by pro-Assad online accounts (see below) give rare glimpses of what could be a new Russian-made anti-drone rifle, the Garpiya. If this were the case, the Syrian Arab Army could have been among the first in the world to widely field this type of anti-drone weapon, reflecting the growing danger posed by FPV drones and other small remotely controlled weapons.
Garpiya anti-drone rifle.
According to a military source in the Syrian opposition, during 2024, “kamikaze drones are launched by Russian special forces from elevated areas along the frontlines in rural Idlib and Aleppo regions,” with “no observed presence of Syrian regime forces during the launches.” This is corroborated by a post by an official military account of the National Liberation Front, a faction of the Syrian anti-Assad rebels. According to the source, the kamikaze drones were guided by Russian observation drones and penetrated as far as 10 kilometers into what was then-rebel-held territory.
Analysis of non-public military footage of the Syrian opposition forces shows the bulk of pro-Assad FPV launch sites being clustered around the localities of Dana, Saraqib and Jabal al-Zawiya in Idlib Province, as well as Base 46, a fortified position in the Aleppo countryside that was the site of a major battle in 2012. According to Nawar Shaban, a researcher with the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, there is evidence that pro-Assad forces were actively developing the drones, such as by installing larger batteries and thus improving range.
Impact on Civilians and Further Implications
The brief period in which FPV drone technology was in the hands of the brutal Syrian Arab Army unfortunately led to Syrian civilians being terrorized by this new weapon. As we can see from the patterns of attacks described by the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, pro-Assad forces were regularly targeting civilians with FPV drones - whether this was perverse “practice” or part of a broader strategy of terror directed at the civilian population, the effects remained the same. Dozens of civilians were targeted, maimed and killed by these devices, particularly at the start of 2024.
Beyond this, FPV drones gave the Assad regime significant tactical and strategic advantages. According to Dr Glenn Kolomeitz, an international law consultant and analyst and former Australian Army legal officer, these weapons are particularly effective in the hands of a faction with little regard for civilian casualties. “From a weaponeering and targetting perspective, FPV drones give commanders greater options and…greater flexibility and accuracy in the battlespace. This is especially the case when collateral damage does not feature prominently in a commander’s targeting decision making and when collateral damage estimates are not an element of the targeting process, both of which appear to be the case with pro-Assad forces.”
Furthermore, according to Dr Kolomeitz, the advantages stretch beyond the battlefield, thanks to what he calls the “Terminator Effect”. “This is the effect on the morale of opposition troops and in the creation of a state of panic and terror in the civilian population, of lethal machines in the nature of loitering munitions operated from a distance,” Dr Kolomeitz told OSINT for Ukraine.
Recall the common tactical usage by pro-Assad forces of barrel bombs - essentially barrels filled with explosives that would be dropped out of helicopters into densely populated areas, with practically no regard to accuracy. Pro-Assad forces consistently demonstrated their reliance on such terror tactics to subdue the civilian population into submission. FPV drones gave them a new vector with which to pursue this strategy, with even less risk for the operators, particularly as engineers devised ways to increase the drones’ range and lethality.
On an even broader scale, the adoption of FPV drone technology could have also been a major cost-cutting measure for the heavily sanctioned Assad regime. “Without reducing the humanitarian impact of these weapons to a cheap quote, these FPV drones deliver Syrian government forces ‘more bang for their buck’,” explains Dr Kolomeitz. “These drones…are far cheaper to make and operate than conventional indirect fire weapons systems…much of the technology, in terms of availability, is commercial off-the-shelf and multi-use.” This also would have made it significantly easier for the Assad regime to manufacture FPV drones, which they had evidently been doing. Though the worst did not come to pass, even if the international community were to attempt to restrict another similarly rogue state’s ability to access the components needed to manufacture the drones, according to Dr Kolomeitz, “rapid advances in and improvements in the largely civilian and multi-use technology makes identifying and subjecting equipment to sanctions difficult.” That Russia and Iran are both making strides in homegrown manufacturing of FPV drones made it all the easier for rogue states’ to access the critical components for building drones.
Thankfully, the worst-case scenario did not come to pass. Despite several dozens of recorded FPV drone attacks on civilians in the year or so prior to the fall of the Assad regime, the rebel offensive of December 2024 decisively put an end to this threat. Rather ironically, a large part of the success of the rebel offensive was due to their own astute use of FPV drones - likely involving Ukrainian trainers and even operators. Another armed Syrian faction, the Kurdish-dominated SDF, has also recently been using FPV drones in its fight against Turkish-backed militias.
However, the Russian involvement in training FPV pilots in the Syrian army does reflect the growing influence the Russian state is currently exerting, fueled by the experience it has acquired in its invasion of Ukraine. According to Dr Kolomeitz, Syria had become a “laboratory for drones,” allowing Russia to “test the ability of a client state to manufacture low-cost FPV drones locally using commercial technology, and test the ability to get around sanctions regimes.” With Russia and several of its allied states currently operating under sanctioned regimes, this was an invaluable opportunity for the Russian state to acquire realtime experience, both for its own ability to circumvent sanctions, and for its ability to support allied states and exert its influence. In doing so, Dr Kolomeitz says that “Russia has bought a seat at the table of Middle Eastern influence”.
This experience also helped Russia develop its own capabilities. For decades, the Russian military has been gradually evolving from its Soviet roots to develop more contemporary capabilities suited to today’s geopolitical and military climate. A major reflection of this shift is Russia’s focus on developing relatively small-scale expeditionary capabilities - as seen in its 2014 invasion of Ukraine, its intervention in Syria, and its involvement in numerous African conflicts. As such, training pro-Assad forces in FPV drone usage is “consistent with Russia’s application of its new generation warfare construct”, which Dr Kolomeitz explains possesses “an increasingly technological character”.
This can go a long way in offsetting the Russian state’s ailing weapons export industry. “If its FPV drone training role in Syria is anything to go by, it is not a long stretch to say that the sale of arms as a lever of influence is steadily being replaced by the sale of FPV drone expertise as a very niche lever of influence,” explains Dr Kolomeitz.
As such, the recent proliferation of FPV drone technology within pro-Assad forces carries significant implications beyond the battlefields of Syria. Through its experiences in Ukraine, the Russian military now has a level of expertise in modern large-scale combat far beyond virtually any other state in the world, barring Ukraine. This gives Russia the ability to project influence in a manner in which its rivals cannot, at least not to the same ability. Of particular significance in this is the welfare of civilians in Russia’s area of influence. Russian troops and their allies have developed a deserved reputation for their harm to civilians - whether in Ukraine, Syria, the Central African Republic, or the Sahel states, death stalks civilians wherever the Russian military and its proxies are involved. Through sharing its technological expertise, the Russian state makes it easier for its questionable allies to accomplish their agendas. While Russian ambitions in Syria were dealt a major blow in December 2024, Moscow retains the capability to exert influence through its military expertise.
FPV drones certainly represent a new frontier in warfare, and unfortunately, Russia is at the cutting edge of this frontier. The onus is on everyone else to catch up.
The Arabic version of this investigation can be found on Daraj.media.
[1] Alexey Lenkov, Production of 5,000 Gastello kamikaze UAVs monthly begins – Russia, BulgarianMilitary.com, August 6, 2023, viewed February 15, 2025, https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2023/08/06/production-of-5000-gastello-kamikaze-uavs-monthlybegins-russia/
